Investment in Good Jobs by Teixeira, Paulino
Economic Note
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Paulino Teixeira, Faculdade de Economia, Universidade
de Coimbra
Relaxing the standard assumption of one price in labor markets, we evaluate the impact
of labor subsidies, namely, the effects of an industrial policy designed to reallocate workers
from low-wage to high-wage industries through subsidization of training costs. We found
that the welfare gains can be substantial, and, in contrast to well-established results, the
wage gap between low-paid workers and high-paid workers is actually reduced.  1999
Society for Policy Modeling. Published by Elsevier Science Inc.
1. INTRODUCTION
A necessary condition for industrial policy is the existence of market imperfec-
tions that causes factors of production in certain industries to earn economic
rents. In fully competitive labor markets, firms hire factors up to the point at
which the value of their marginal product is equal to their marginal cost, and
wages are the same in all sectors so that there is no room for any industrial
targeting.
Because, as we shall see in detail below, wages (adjusted for skill mix) are
not equalized across sectors, and firms are assumed to operate on their labor
demand curves, the marginal product of labor will not be equated across sectors,
resulting in allocative inefficiency. In such a situation, there will be too little
employment in high-wage sectors and too much employment in low-wage sectors.
Welfare gains are then to be expected if a worker shifts into the high-wage/high-
productivity sectors from elsewhere.
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We tackle the issue of labor subsidies assuming that the observed interindustry
wage differences reflect different training technologies across industries, and
hence, different turnover costs. Based on efficiency wage considerations, we
then evaluate, within a general equilibrium framework, the impact of subsidies
in Portuguese labor markets, namely, the effects of an industrial policy designed
to reallocate workers from low-wage to high-wage industries through subsidiza-
tion of training costs.
2. INTERINDUSTRY WAGE DIFFERENTIALS
Our approach to wage differentials reflects the empirical regularities reported
by Dickens and Katz (1987), Kruegar and Summers (1988), and Katz and Sum-
mers (1989a), who observe that interindustry earnings differentials persist after
controlling for the usual human capital variables, inter al. Of course, observed
differences in earnings across industries may reflect unmeasured human capital
quality. The argument usually made is that there is no reason to believe that
observed and unobserved ability—quality of labor—are unrelated or vary across
sectors in a systematic manner. Moreover, controlling for working conditions
such as weekly hours, health hazards, commuting time, overtime hours, physical
work conditions, and so on, does not seem to substantially change either the
pattern of industry wages or the standard deviation of the industry wage differen-
tials. Longitudinal evidence also casts some doubt on the hypothesis that industry
wage differentials are due to unobserved individual heterogeneity. Indeed, look-
ing at individual workers when they move between industries, either by reasons
of displacement or voluntary quits, their wage changes tend to mirror existing
industry wage differentials (e.g., Kruegar and Summers, 1988).
Crucial to our CGE implementation are the earnings function parameter
estimates for the Portuguese labor markets, which were taken from Kiker and
Santos (1991). There is, however, an important data qualification. These wage
regressions do not control for working conditions. In other words, the observed
wage differentials may well reflect compensating wage differentials for undesir-
able job characteristics. As mentioned, Krueger and Summers and Katz and
Summers have suggested that the observed wage pattern does not substantially
change after controlling for working conditions. But, can we comfortably general-
ize this finding to other countries? It seems, indeed, we cannot. Evidence from
Sweden (Edin and Zetterberg, 1992), for instance, shows that the interindustry
wage differences narrow sharply with the inclusion of working conditions vari-
ables. Unfortunately, we do not have such evidence from Portugal, but to proceed
with our policy exercise we take the observed wage differences as noncompensat-
ing wage differentials.
Computation of wage differentials is as follows. Based upon the earnings
function parameter estimates, we normalize the estimated industry wage differen-
tials as deviations from the weighted mean differential. Following Krueger and
Summers (1988, p. 263, fn. 4), we treat the omitted industry variable as having
a zero effect on wages, compute the employment-weighted average of wage
differentials for all industries, and report the difference between the industry
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differentials and the weighted average. The resulting key statistic, then, is the
proportionate difference in wages between an employee in a given industry and
the average employee. Based on this procedure we compute the estimated wage
differentials for 17 industries, which are the raw data for our 40-sector model
aggregation. Benchmark wage distortions are documented in Table 1.
3. TRAINING COSTS AND INDUSTRY PATTERNS
OF TRAINING
The underlying hypothesis of our policy exercise is that high wages reflect
efficiency considerations, namely that high wages are determined by higher
industry-specific training costs. The usual argument (e.g., Salop, 1973) is that
the presence of such costs make firms willing to pay a wage higher than would
obtain in their absence so as to reduce costly turnover among trained workers.
Under these conditions, it follows that firms do not have the incentive to lower
wages even if there is an excess supply of willing applicants waiting in a queue
to be hired. Thus, firms have to decide on the wage rate, the quit rate, and the
scale of production. Individual workers, in turn, must decide about whether to
quit the current job to search for better job alternatives, and whether to accept
any offers when they are unemployed. Wage differences arise from the fact that
the optimal wage for firms to pay will depend on their production/training
technologies.
The economics of training is a complex matter and largely an open research
field. Little is known on the extent and nature of training, and not much is
known on why and how enterprises train, the resource costs and payoffs to
training, and whether some labor market structures provide more or different
incentives to effective training than others. Presumably, training will vary with
age, sex, level of education, and industry. If young workers have higher mobility,
firms will tend to offer them little or no training, or training will only be provided
after they have proven their stability. There is also evidence that women are less
likely to receive formal on-the-job training and/or employer-sponsored outside
training; and that better educated workers are nearly always more likely to
receive more training than their less educated counterparts.
The first crucial distinction to make is between specific and general training.
Firm-specific training enhances productivity only in the firm that provides the
training, whereas general training can be used in other firms once completed.
In the simplest model, firms will never provide general training, unless employees
are bound to the firm. Otherwise these firms will be seriously harmed (“poached”)
by free riders who have provided no training. This implies that workers will
have to pay for general skills. Workers are in general, however, unable to acquire
the required amounts of general training. Firms subject to less stringent liquidity
constraints, with easier access to capital markets, are in a good position to provide
general training, but they need to be sure that their investment will be recouped.
In turn, if training provides specific skills, workers are less willing to finance the
investment,and firms are equally reluctant to commit themselves to all training
expenditures, fearing that workers will quit before they recoup their investment.
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That is, in both general and specific training, training costs probably will be
shared, and employees and employers will have to agree on wage and compensa-
tion schemes that raise job mobility costs and reduce turnover.
The most significant empirical regularities in training incidence across indus-
tries and across countries can be summarized as follows (e.g., OECD, 1991).
Nondurable manufacturing industries, such as textiles, clothing, leather, and
footwear, tend to have a relatively low incidence of training in most countries.
The same obtains for construction, food, hotels and restaurants, and agriculture.
By contrast, the financial sector is a high-incidence industry in the majority of the
cases. Petroleum products, office machinery, electricity, machinery, and public
services all seem to offer relatively more training. But the fragile nature of the
training data, makes comparisons across countries and even across industries
hazardous. Consider, for example, the retail sector. This industry is generally
associated with high labor turnover, yet its training incidence is typically equal
to or even higher than the respective national averages. This may be reflect the
measure considered in the OECD study, which takes as its statistical unit the
overall incidence of training. Although high turnover encourages employer reluc-
tance to engage in training, it also makes for a continuous training effort, even
if it is mostly of short duration.
4. THE SMALL OPEN ECONOMY (SOE)
MODEL IMPLEMENTATION
4A. General Model Structure
The model is a general equilibrium model in the Arrow-Debreu tradition,
and follows Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr (1993). It is a static, single-period
CGE version, with a single household, no capital accumulation, constant returns
to scale production with competitive pricing, no terms-of-trade effects, and no
labor-leisure choice (i.e., labor supply is fixed). The actual implementation of
the model puts together the GAMS software (Brooke, Kendrick, and Meeraus,
1988) to generate all input files including all policy scenarios, and the MPS/GE
program solver (Rutherford, 1989) to compute the general equilibrium solutions.
Another attractive feature of this implementation is that it easily handles the
Systematic Sensitivity Analysis (Harrison, 1990) as described in Section 5 below.
Also, the MPS/GE software is designed to greatly ease all standard benchmark
procedures (i.e., calibration of all functional parameters).
The model replicates a historical data set as an equilibrium. The 1984 input–
output table is the basic data source and the structure of the model comprises
the utility function of the representative consumer, government expenditure,
investment demand, Armington aggregates of domestic and imported commodi-
ties, value-added functions of primary factor inputs labor and capital, and Leon-
tief aggregates of intermediate and value-added components. Only constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) and constant elasticity of transformation (CET)
aggregators are allowed in the model. The CET aggregator combines domestic
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sales and exports. Besides interindustry wage distortions, the model takes into
account indirect tax distortions, production subsidies, and import tariffs.
The benchmark values of all relevant elasticities were derived from an exten-
sive literature search (Teixeira, 1992). The lack of reliable data on many elasticity
parameters is then addressed through extensive parameter perturbation. This
exercise is undertaken using a Monte Carlo simulation that randomizes all elastic-
ity parameters independently. The relevant question here is whether or not our
reported results are robust to parameter perturbation. As shown in Table 2, it
seems that the results do not depend upon particular values of the relevant
elasticities. In other words, the point estimate elasticities are not driving the
results.
4B. Calibration of Training Costs
Calibration of industry-specific training costs is done in the following way.
First, we take the observed pattern of interindustry wage differentials as reflecting
optimal responses by firms to different training costs. Then we consider that
changes in employment across sectors are a function of relative wages, and are
mediated by the training activities of each sector. That is, any worker moving
from sector ith to sector jth will have to go through a training activity in the
latter sector before being fully productive. Furthermore, there is no cost sharing
in training costs, that is, all costs arising from firm-specific training are entirely
borne by the firm.
The relationship between the wage rate in sectors ith and jth the is obtained
assuming that firms minimize wage costs plus training costs. That is, the firm’s
goal is to find the optimal strategy mix of wages and quit rate such that total
costs are minimized, taking into account that the lower the wage, the higher the
quit rate, and the higher the quit rate, the higher the training costs. Taking w0
as the reservation wage, and the quit rate in sector ith simply as w0/wi, the
endogenous wage rate is given by wi 5 √tiw0, where ti is the constant marginal
training cost. The training cost is then calibrated using the reported wage differen-
tials.
Note that under this scenario wage differences are taken to be endogenous,
that is, they are a function of industry conditions as well as overall economic
conditions. The tightness of labor markets, for instance, affects the worker’s quit
decision and, hence, the firm’s optimal strategy mix of wages and quit rate. If
the endogenous reference wage w0 goes down—if the labor market tightness
parameter falls—then wi also falls and the wage premium, wi 2 w0, enjoyed by
workers in the ith sector will fall too.
Finally, our reservation wage w0 is the wage in the low-wage/low-training
sectors, textiles and clothing, and leather and footwear. These two sectors not
only have the highest negative wage differentials, but also they have the largest
share of employment in manufacturing (more than 30%).
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5. SUBSIDIZING LABOR MARKETS
The existence of high-wage and low-wage sectors can be interpreted as mean-
ing that there are too many people in “bad” industries and too few in “good”
industries. It has been suggested in the literature (e.g., Katz and Summers, 1989a,
1989b) that a direct subsidy to employment in high-wage sectors in an amount
just sufficient to offset the wage differences would allow the economy to attain
the first-best allocation of labor (that is, uniform wage rates after correction
for differences in skills and the attractiveness of the job). Apart from obvious
implementation difficulties, the policy may also result in even wider wage disper-
sion (Katz and Summers 1989a, p. 249), and there is no guarantee that such
efficiency-enhancing subsidies will make some workers better off without making
others worse off. As Bulow and Summers (1986) have shown, subsidies to high-
paid jobs will not produce Pareto improvements if workers in low-paid jobs
lack the skills to enter in high-wage/high-productivity industries. In our setting,
however, we rule out this event, because workers are fully mobile between
sectors through training.
We note that the possibility of a wider wage dispersion in Katz and Summers’
(1989) formulation arises from the fact that wage differentials are taken as a
nondecreasing function of employment on the grounds that workers’ ability to
extract rents is increased when the demand for labor is high or because the cost
of leaving a job is lower if there is an increase in employment in high-wage
industries. This hypothesis of course goes back to Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984),
who suggested that firms may have to pay efficiency wages to lessen worker’s
incentive to shirk. In other works, if it is difficult or costly to monitor a worker’s
effort, then it may be rational for firms to pay premium wages, that is, wages
higher than the “going wage.”
In the formulation presented here, a firm that faces relatively higher training
costs, and hence, higher costs from labor turnover, will also find optimal to pay
premium wages. However, if employment in high-wage sectors increases, the
wage gap is expected to be narrower rather than wider because the relative
wage in low-training incidence sectors (i.e., the reservation wage w0) tends to
increase. The crucial factor is that wage differentials across industries are based
on labor turnover rather than on worker’s ability to shirk, and hence, we are
not forced to make any restrictions on the behavior of wage differentials.
Our policy exercise consists of successively reducing the training costs borne
by firms in their production processes by 10, 20, and 50 percent of the benchmark
levels. Table 2, column 3 (PE), presents the points estimate results of this experi-
ment in terms of welfare gains. For simplicity, these reductions—achieved, say,
by means of a nationwide training program—are assumed not to consume real
resources. Funding of these training programs may, of course, be an issue, and a
thorough analysis should have taken into account the fact that either government
financing through a higher budget deficit or unilateral capital transfers from, for
example, the European Union, have a sizable impact on the Portuguese economy
beyond the direct effect of cost reductions on firms’s labor demand.
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The welfare effects of the reduction of training costs can be very substantial
as shown by the 0.6 percent gain in GDP when training costs are 80 percent of
the initial level. A 50 percent reduction implies a welfare gain of almost 0.8
percent. Given that there is uncertainty around elasticity parameters, to report
point estimate results rather than histograms of frequency or confidence intervals
for the endogenous variables may be misleading. In Table 2, we present the results
of the sensitivity analysis. The welfare gains using point estimate elasticities are
virtually identical to the mean (and median) of a sample distribution drawn
from a systematic sensitivity analysis (Monte Carlo simulation) that randomizes
all elasticity parameters independently according to previously specified distribu-
tions.1 This is true for all scenarios under consideration.
Interestingly enough, in all three across-the-board reductions in training costs
(10, 20, and 50%), high-wage sectors increase their share of total employment
relative to the benchmark level, high (low) wage sectors being defined as indus-
tries where workers’ average pay is higher (lower) than the pay of the average
employee (adjusted for skill mix). Labor demand in high-wage sectors increases
by (weighted averages) 2.4, 4.5, and 9.7 percent, in the 10, 20, and 50 percent
cost reduction cases, while in low-wage sectors the increase in clearly lower: 0.2,
0.3, and 0.6 percent, respectively. Labor demand in the reference sectors (textiles
and clothing and leather and footwear) falls by 20.7, 36.6 and 65.5 percent, which
means that the economy has decisively moved towards the first-best allocation
of labor.
The last two scenarios—20 percent (high-wage) and 20 percent (low-wage)—
illustrate the cases where training subsidies are alternatively direct to high-wage
sectors and low-wage sectors with a 20 percent reduction in training costs. As
Table 3 shows, because labor subsidies to low-training incidence sectors shift
labor into low-wage industries—employment in high-wage sectors in the 20
percent (low-wage) case falls by 1.3 percent—the welfare gains when labor
subsidies go to low-wage sectors are a wash. Moreover, there seems no cause
for concern with an “antiegalitarian” policy of subsidizing those who are already
better off. In fact, the wage dispersion increases when subsidies are directed to
“bad” jobs and decreases when they go to “good” jobs. Specifically, in the former,
the wage rate in high-wage sectors increases by 3.7 percent, while it decreases
by 7.2 percent in low-wage sectors. Conversely, a training policy directed to
high-wage industries implies a 10.1 percent and 21.5 percent change in the wage
rate in low- and high-wage industries, respectively. This narrower wage gap
1 In the sensitivity exercise, the elasticities of substitution are allowed to take the follow-
ing equiprobable values: (a) utility function: 0, 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, and 2.0; the point estimate
(benchmark) elasticity is 1.0; (b) top level Armington aggregate: 0.5, 0.75, 1.0, 1.25, and
1.5 of the point estimate; (c) top level production function (Leontief aggregate): 0, 0.5,
and 1; the point estimate is 0. The elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in
the value-added function and the elasticity of transformation between domestic sales and
exports follow a normal distribution and can take five equiprobable values, given the
standard errors of the respective estimates. Full reference of this procedure can be found
in Harrison (1990) and Teixeira (1992).
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Table 3: Labor Subsidies and Employment (Percentage Changes). Scenario:
20% Training Cost Reduction in Low-Wage Sectors
(% Change) (% Change)
High-wage sectors
REF 21.1 WOO 21.1
EGW 23.2 TRD 22.0
FNF 20.3 INL 23.6
ONM 21.4 MAT 214.1
CMA 21.1 AXT 28.1
CHM 20.7 COM 23.3
FAB 21.2 BNK 23.5
MAC 21.2 REN 25.2
ELM 21.8 BSE 24.6
VEH 23.0 PUB 20.2
Low-wage sectors
AGR 8.1 PAP 21.7
FOR 11.6 RUB 5.6
FIS 5.0 OMP 14.4
MEA 6.2 CON 4.3
MLK 5.8 REP 12.9
CEP 6.6 RES 10.0
OFP 7.5 MSE 24.8
BEV 11.5 MSH 24.9
TOB 9.7 OMS 14.4
between “good” and “bad” jobs is still reinforced by an increase of 20.4 and 7.7
percent—20 percent (high-wage) and 20 percent (low-wage) cases, respec-
tively—in the reservation wage (i.e., the wage of textiles and clothing and leather
and footwear workers). In turn, if subsidies are directed to “good” jobs, employ-
ment in high-wage industries increases by 6.2 percent, while it decreases by 1.9
and 31.5 percent in low-wage sectors and in the reference sectors, respectively.
According to our maintained hypothesis of constant marginal training costs, it
seems, therefore, that the fear of increasing “unfairness” in labor markets due
to the subsidization of labor in high-wage/high-productivity sectors is unfounded,
and there is no reason to anticipate increasing wage dispersion.
6. CONCLUSION
We have tested, in a general equilibrium framework, a policy exercise aimed
to pull labor away from low-wage industries towards high-wage industries. It
seems that if turnover costs are assumed to explain the observed pattern of
industry wage differences, then a policy that subsidizes “good” jobs—namely,
the training costs borne by firms in high-wage industries—can produce substantial
welfare gains. Moreover, we found that (1) if the same resources are instead
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allocated to labor in “bad” jobs (low-wage industries), the welfare gains are a
wash or even negative; and (2) even if the subsidies are given to those sectors
of the labor market in which workers are already better off, the wage differential
between low-paid workers and high-paid workers is actually reduced. Enthusiasm
for this type of policy must, however, be tempered by the difficulties of imple-
menting structural policies.
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